Context: Many recent research areas such as human cognition and quantum physics call the observer-independence of traditional science into question. Also, there is a growing need for self-reflexivity in science, i.e., a science that reflects on its own outcomes and products. Problem: We introduce the concept of second-order science that is based on the operation of re-entry. Our goal is to provide an overview of this largely unexplored science domain and of potential approaches in second-order fields. Method: We provide the (...) necessary conceptual groundwork for explorations in second-order science, in which we discuss the differences between first- and second-order science and where we present a roadmap for second-order science. The article operates mainly with conceptual differentiations such as the separation between three seemingly identical concepts such as Science II, Science 2.0 and second-order science. Results: Compared with first-order science, the potential of second-order science lies in 1. higher levels of novelty and innovations, 2. higher levels of robustness and 3. wider integration as well as higher generality. As first-order science advances, second-order science, with re-entry as its basic operation, provides three vital functions for first-order science, namely a rich source of novelty and innovation, the necessary quality control and greater integration and generality. Implications: Second-order science should be viewed as a major expansion of traditional scientific fields and as a scientific breakthrough towards a new wave of innovative research. Constructivist content: Second-order science has strong ties with radical constructivism, which can be qualified as the most important root/origin of second-order science. Moreover, it will be argued that a new form of cybernetics is needed to cope with the new problems and challenges of second-order science. (shrink)

Context: The journal Constructivist Foundations celebrates ten years of publishing articles on constructivist approaches, in particular radical constructivism. Problem: In order to preserve the sustainability of radical constructivism and regain its appeal to new generations of researchers, we set up a new course of action for and with the radical constructivist community to study its innovative potential. This new avenue is “second-order science.” Method: We specify two motivations of second-order science, i.e., the inclusion of the observer, and self-reflexivity that allows (...) second-order science to operate on the products of normal or first-order science. Also, we present a short overview of the contributions that we have collected for this inaugural issue on second-order science. Results: These six initial contributions demonstrate the potential of the new set of approaches to second-order science across several disciplines. Implications: Second-order science is believed to be a cogent concept in the evolution of science, leading to a new wave of innovations, novel experiments and a much closer relationship with current research in the cognitive neurosciences in particular, and with evolutionary and complexity theories in general. (shrink)

Context: Although second-order cybernetics was proposed as a new way of cybernetic investigations around 1970, its general status and its modus operandi are still far from obvious. Problem: We want to provide a new perspective on the scope and the currently available potential of second-order cybernetics within today’s science landscapes. Method: We invited a group of scholars who have produced foundational work on second-order cybernetics in recent years, and organized an open call for new approaches to second-order cybernetics. The accepted (...) contributions are discussed and mapped. We also investigate the relations between second-order cybernetics and second-order science. Results: We present a coherent outlook on the scope of second-order cybernetics today, identify a general methodology of science and show that second-order cybernetics can be used in a large number of disciplines that go well beyond purely scientific domains. These results are based on a new epistemic mode “from within,” which can be traced back directly to von Foerster. We also arrived at the conclusion that from its early years onwards second-order cybernetics was developed in two different ways, so that second-order cybernetics and second-order science operate in different domains. Implications: Both the coherent perspective of the scope of second-order cybernetics with a new five-part agenda and the outline for a general methodology of science based on a new epistemic mode that was created within and for second-order cybernetics demonstrate the growing importance of reflexivity in science, which, so far, has not been widely recognized. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Luhmann and the Constructivist Heritage: A Critical Reflection” by Armin Scholl. Upshot: The comment starts with Buchinger’s assessment that Luhmann’s contribution to constructivism is original and inspiring, but raises more questions than answers. In three variations, the comment tries to show that Luhmann can indeed be viewed as a big question-generator and that his heritage for radical constructivism may lie in the original and inspiring effects these new and additional questions can produce.

Purpose: Several accounts like Ernst von Glasersfeld's Who Conceives of Society? (2008) locate empirical research in the social sciences and radical constructivism in almost parallel universes. The main purpose of this paper is to argue for more inter-active relations and to stress the importance of establishing weak, medium and strong ties between radical constructivism and empirical social research in general. Findings: The article shows that that weak, medium and strong ties between radical constructivism and empirical research in the social sciences (...) can be established. Moreover, these weak, medium and strong ties play a crucial role for increasing and maintaining the relevance of radical constructivism within the social sciences and for contributing to the viability of radical constructivism in the long run. Implications: The most important consequence for radical constructivism lies in a new research agenda. In the course of this article weak, medium and strong ties to empirical research have been specified specifically and exclusively for the social sciences. But these specific links cannot be simply generalized or transferred to other disciplinary fields outside the social sciences. Since interactive links between radical constructivism and empirical research are currently missing in practically all disciplines, these weak, medium and strong links, as a new RC-agenda, have to be developed separately for each major scientific research arena. (shrink)

Purpose: Josef Mitterer's essays are considered to be important philosophical advancements of radical constructivism. The main purposes of this paper are, on the one hand, to structure the RC landscape and, on the other hand, to investigate the relations of Mitterer's work to radical constructivism in particular and to philosophy in general. Findings: In this short essay focusing on Mitterer's Das Jenseits der Philosophie, I would like to stress two major points. First, Mitterer's book should be considered as one of (...) several contemporary variants of a radical critique of the semantic turn in the philosophy of science that has taken place since the mid-thirties with the works of Rudolf Carnap, Carl G. Hempel, Hilary Putnam, Alfred Tarski and others. Second, it is by no means clear how to determine the relevance of the new semantic critique for the present and future cognitive status of radical constructivism. The degree of relevance depends crucially on the use of the term "radical constructivism." If radical constructivism, as I will argue, is seen as an umbrella term for a group of empirical research programs, then, by sheer necessity, the relevance can be marginal only. If, however, radical constructivism is viewed as a special form of philosophy of language and/or as a new epistemology, then the importance of Josef Mitterer's approach must be judged within the context of available functional alternatives. Implications: An immediate consequence of this article lies in a renewed emphasis on advancing an empirical research agenda for radical constructivism and in an effective downsizing of radical constructivism as a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: The subtitle of “An Austrian Contribution” emphasizes a basic distinction between German and Austrian traditions in the philosophy of fields of science. In S. J. Schmidt’s genuinely German way of writing, one can observe a high emphasis on terminology and a specific arena of heavy philosophical problems that have to be solved in a strictly philosophical manner, whereas the (...) Austrian tradition places its importance on scientific progress, especially in the natural sciences, and on the clarifying, mediating, and self-reflecting role of philosophy within the overall context of scientific evolution. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: I will make the point that radical constructivism von Glasersfeld style unnecessarily plays only a passive or an inactive role. Quite obviously, I want to demonstrate that there is life for radical constructivism outside its seemingly irrelevant function in empirical social research and that it is possible to develop radical constructivism in designs with tangible consequences and effects for the cognitive routines in the social (...) sciences. In short, it is conceivable, despite “Who Conceives of Society?”, that radical constructivism matters. (shrink)

Context: The main problem is the rather marginal status of radical constructivism within its core domains of brain research, cognition and learning. Problem: The basic goal is to provide a short history of radical constructivism and its institutionalization processes. Additionally, the article specifies critical conditions that should be met in order for radical constructivism to become a mainstream endeavor. Method: The main methods used are those of comparative historical research. Results: The main results lie in the specification of missing elements (...) that have blocked radical constructivism becoming a mainstream endeavor. Implications: The paper might serve as a common reference for necessary steps to be taken over the following years in order to move radical constructivism out of its current weak position. (shrink)

Purpose: The article pursues three aims. First, it intends to differentiate between two different approaches for knowledge studies, namely an empirical and a normative mode. In a second move, two different epistemologies in the work of Ernst von Glasersfeld will be introduced under the labels of “Epistemology I” and “Epistemology II.” Epistemology I relates to empirical research, Epistemology II is normative in nature. Third, the article makes the point that while Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology II has already been presented in (...) a finite and mature form, his empirical analysis of cognitive processes still provides a rich pool of tools and designs that should be further developed and advanced in the years and decades ahead. Method: The article is analytical in nature, identifying the different building blocks and relational networks of von Glasersfeld’s two epistemologies. By this, the article intends to contribute to a further advancement of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I. Results: The main finding lies in recognizing the radical and innovative elements of von Glasersfeld’s Epistemology I and on the still-challenging research designs of Epistemology I. (shrink)